The Myth of Control

"Sanity, as the project of keeping ourselves recognizably human, therefore has to limit the range of human experience. To keep faith with recognition we have to stay recognizable. Sanity, in other words, becomes a pressing preoccupation as soon as we recognize the importance of recognition. When we define ourselves by what we can recognize, by what we can comprehend--rather than, say, by what we can describe--we are continually under threat from what we are unwilling and/or unable to see. We are tyrannised by our blind spots, and by whatever it is about our universe that we find unacceptable.” Adam Phillips

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I. Introduction

Whither control? And what is it we are referring to when we wish for more of it? And is control nothing but a term we use to defend ourselves when feeling cut-off from something more certain? Control is a term we use to describe our relationship to the world, both inside and outside ourselves. It is a word that implies a distinction between what we can and cannot do, what we can and cannot know, what we can and cannot change. Control is a word that tells us something about our desires and our fears, our hopes, and our limits. Control is a word that can be divided into two kinds: the control we have over ourselves, and the control we have over otherness. Nevertheless, control is also a word that can mislead us, for it suggests a clarity and a certainty that may not exist.

Control is a modern obsession, a legacy of a historical moment when humans began to see themselves as the masters of their destinies. The Enlightenment gave us the idea that we could use reason and will to shape the world according to our vision (see Kant, 1781; Descartes, 1637). The scientific and industrial revolutions gave us the tools and the confidence to make this idea a reality Control is a modern dream, a fantasy of power and progress (see Galison, 1990).

Control is a modern invention, a product of a historical process that shaped our societies and ourselves. Capitalism and the state made us believe that we could control everything, from nature to society, from resources to people, from processes to outcomes (see Weber, 1922). Control became the logic and the goal of our social systems. Nonetheless control also became a way of relating to ourselves, a way of regulating our thoughts, feelings, bodies, and lives (see Foucault, 1975). Control became the measure and the means of our personal success, happiness, and health (see Rose, 1998). Control became a modern ideal, a fantasy of order and harmony.

Control is a psychological need, a way of making sense of our environment and ourselves. The feeling that we have control over our situation gives us confidence, motivation, and resilience (Bandura, 1977). Nevertheless, control is also a psychological trap, a way of deceiving ourselves about our influence and abilities (Langer, 1975). The illusion of control can make us overconfident, reckless, and blind to the reality of our competence or limitation (Dunning & Kruger, 1999; Taylor & Brown, 1988). Control is a psychological paradox, a source of strength and weakness.

Control is a cultural construct, a way of creating meaning and order in our societies and ourselves. Control is a word that we use to describe and prescribe our relation to the world, a word that shapes our language, our symbols, our stories, our values (e.g., Saussure, 1916; Barthes, 1967). Control is a word that tells us who we are and who we should be, a word that assigns us responsibility and blame for our outcomes (e.g., Foucault, 1975). Notwithstanding control is also a cultural illusion, a way of hiding the complexity and uncertainty of our existence. Control is a word that conceals the influence of the unconscious, the unknown, the other, on our behaviour and experience (e.g., Freud, 1894, 1923). Control is a word that ignores the limits of our consciousness and the mystery of our minds, the questions that we cannot answer about ourselves and our emotions (e.g., Chalmers, 1995; Dennett, 1991; Velmans, 2000). Control is a cultural fantasy, a source of comfort and anxiety.

Control is a modern myth, a way of denying the complexity and interdependence of our world. Control is a word that assumes that we can know and influence everything, that we can reduce and simplify reality to our own terms (Lorenz, 1963; Prigogine & Stengers, 1984). Control is a word that rejects the possibility of uncertainty and surprise, the possibility of learning and changing. However, control is also a modern challenge, a way of inviting us to explore other ways of relating to ourselves and the world. Control is a word that can be questioned and redefined, that can open up new perspectives and possibilities (Capra, 1996; Giddens, 1991; Mason, 1993). Control is a word that can inspire us to embrace self-organization, adaptability, and resilience, to accept the complexity and unpredictability of life.

The myth of control is deeply ingrained in our contemporary societies, shaping our personal dreams and collective endeavours, as well as the institutions we build. It is a concept born of a historical and philosophical pivot that positioned human intellect and volition as the sovereign rulers of our existence, and bequeathed us the assurance and the instruments to mould our world to mirror our desires. It is a concept that offers us the promise of safety and predictability when faced with the mysteries and uncertainties of life. But this same myth of control is also our deceiver, for it shrouds the intricate web of connections and dependencies that constitute our existence. It conceals the significant influence of the unconscious, the other, the fortuitous, in shaping our behaviours and experiences. It overlooks the finite reach of our conscious awareness and the enigmatic nature of our minds, the quandaries we grapple with regarding our identities and emotional lives. It is a concept that both entices and haunts our lived experience.

1. The illusion of control as a psychological phenomenon

The illusion of control is a way of deceiving ourselves about our influence and abilities. It is a way of making sense of a world that often escapes our expectations and desires. It is a way of creating order and meaning in a world that is complex and unpredictable; it is a way of boosting our confidence and our will, giving us the feeling that we can do and change anything, that we can overcome any obstacle or challenge; it is a way of coping with uncertainty and anxiety (Langer, 1975; Taylor & Brown, 1988).

Langer's (1975) work on the illusion of control demonstrated that people are more likely to exhibit this bias under specific conditions, such as when they are involved in the decision-making process, when the outcome is perceived as contingent upon their actions, or when there are elements in the situation that resemble skill-based tasks. For example, in gambling scenarios, individuals may feel a heightened sense of control when they can choose their lottery numbers or when they are allowed to roll the dice themselves. These conditions create an illusion of personal influence over random outcomes, leading to overconfidence and increased risk-taking behaviour.

The illusion of control is closely related to other cognitive biases, such as the availability heuristic and the representativeness heuristic, which are mental shortcuts that individuals use to simplify complex information and make decisions (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). For instance, people may overestimate their control in a situation because they can easily recall instances where they had successfully influenced outcomes in the past or because the current situation appears similar to previous experiences where they had control.

It is important to note that the illusion of control does not always have negative consequences. As Taylor and Brown (1988) argue, positive illusions, including the illusion of control, can contribute to mental health and well-being by fostering motivation, self-esteem, and optimism. However, when the illusion of control becomes excessive or persistent, it can lead to maladaptive behaviours, such as engaging in risky activities, ignoring external feedback, or neglecting to seek help when needed.

The illusion of control is a pervasive psychological phenomenon that involves the overestimation of personal influence over events and outcomes. This cognitive bias arises from the interplay between situational factors and cognitive heuristics, leading individuals to search for patterns and causality even in the face of randomness. While the illusion of control can provide psychological benefits in certain contexts, it is crucial to recognise its potential pitfalls and to strive for a balanced and realistic understanding of personal agency and control.

2. The relationship between certainty-uncertainty and safe-unsafe continua in the context of the myth of control

Among the most profound conundrums of our existence is the challenge of navigating the unpredictability and uncertainty inherent in our world. We yearn for predictability and security, yet we inhabit a realm that frequently confounds our anticipations and aspirations; life unfolds on a backdrop of precarious uncertainty, and this backdrop can often seem threatening. We strive to dominate our surroundings, both internally and externally, by employing our rationality, our accumulated wisdom, and our technological prowess. We maintain a conviction, a positive conviction no less, that we can exert mastery over all elements, from the natural world to societal structures, and from the unfolding of events to the ebb and flow of emotions (Langer, 1975; Mason, 1993; Taylor & Brown, 1988). We term this the illusion of control, a somewhat soothing yet misleading notion that we possess the ability to enforce structure and harmony upon a world that is chaotic in nature (Lorenz, 1963).

Certainty and uncertainty are cognitive states that reflect the degree to which individuals perceive their knowledge, predictions, or expectations about the world to be accurate and reliable (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). Certainty often stems from the belief that one has control over a situation, which can create a sense of security and safety (Giddens, 1991). Conversely, uncertainty often arises when individuals feel that they lack control, resulting in feelings of vulnerability, anxiety, and unsafety (Vaillant, 1971).

In the context of the myth of control--the pursuit of certainty and the avoidance of uncertainty--can drive individuals and societies to adopt various strategies, beliefs, and behaviours that reinforce the illusion of control. These beliefs or behaviours might include overconfidence in one's abilities, reliance on cognitive heuristics that simplify complex information, or adherence to rigid routines, rituals, scripts, or belief systems that provide a sense of predictability and order (Langer, 1975; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).

That being so, the interplay between the continua of certainty-uncertainty and safe-unsafe is not in any way linear, as the mirage of control can yield both beneficial and detrimental consequences. On one side of the spectrum, the faith in personal agency or the quest for certainty could bolster psychological health, drive, and resilience, as individuals feel more fortified and enabled to confront life's hurdles (Taylor & Brown, 1988). Conversely, the delusion of control can foster an unfounded sense of security, giving rise to overconfidence, a propensity for risk-laden behaviour, and a disregard for the elaborate and capricious nature of the present world (Langer, 1975).

Recognizing the limitations of control and embracing uncertainty as an integral aspect of human experience can offer alternative ways of engaging with the world, fostering adaptability, flexibility, and resilience (Giddens, 1991; Prigogine & Stengers, 1984). In this sense, the acceptance of uncertainty can paradoxically lead to a greater sense of safety as individuals develop more realistic expectations and coping strategies that consider the ever-changing nature of their environment (Capra, 1996).

The relationship between the continua of certainty-uncertainty and safe-unsafe is intimately connected with the myth of control, reflecting the human desire for predictability, security, and choice in a whimsical unfolding of lived experience. While the pursuit of certainty and control can provide psychological benefits and a sense of safety, it is essential also to recognize its limitations and potential risks. By acknowledging the unfolding uncertainty of life and adopting more flexible and adaptive approaches, individuals can cultivate a more nuanced and sustainable sense of safe uncertainty (Mason, 1993).

3. The limitations of control and exploring alternative perspectives

The myth of control, a tantalising fabric of perception weaved meticulously by individuals and societies, is a rich terrain for scholarly exploration, not least for its profound implications on our understanding of self and society. The myth, a labyrinthine construct of beliefs, behaviours, and systems, is fortified by fantastical notions of control, masking the contours of life's inherent unpredictability and complexity. This warrants a rigorous re-examination, a keenly critical eye cast upon the assumptions, cognitive biases, and social constructs that form the bedrock of this myth (Langer, 1975; Taylor & Brown, 1988; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).

Notably, by interrogating the cognitive and psychological scaffolding that engenders this illusion of control—overconfidence, self-enhancement, and heuristic use—we can pave the way towards alternative outlooks and strategies, fostering an appreciation for the safety nestled within uncertainty.

Such understanding is instrumental in the creation of interventions like cognitive behavioural therapy, mindfulness-based approaches, or psychoeducation. These interventions are designed to kindle a heightened sense of self-awareness, challenge cognitive distortions, and nurture a more realistic, adaptive conception of personal agency and control (Beck, 2011; Kabat-Zinn, 1990). In this vista, we are invited not merely to dispel illusions but also to apprehend the value of adaptability and realism, as we navigate through life's intricacies, guided not by a desire for control, but by an embrace of the uncertainties that permeate our existence.

Another important dimension of the study of the myth of control concerns the social, cultural, and institutional contexts that shape and reinforce the belief in control, including language, narratives, norms, and values (Saussure, 1916; Barthes, 1967; Foucault, 1975). By analysing these contexts, researchers can identify the ways in which the myth of control is perpetuated and contested and devise strategies for fostering a more critical and reflexive culture that values flexibility, adaptability, and openness to change (Giddens, 1991; Nussbaum, 2001).

In addition, the study of the myth of control can contribute to the development of alternative perspectives on increasing safe uncertainty, which focuses on embracing the complexities, ambiguities, and unpredictability of the world rather than seeking to control or eliminate them (Mason, 1993; Stacey, 1996). These perspectives may draw upon insights from complexity science, systems thinking, and poststructuralist theories, which highlight the interdependent, emergent, and non-linear nature of human experience and challenge conventional notions of control, stability, and order (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984; Capra, 1996; Deleuze & Guattari, 1987).

Such alternative perspectives can inform the design of policies, practices, and interventions that promote safe uncertainty by fostering resilience, collaboration, and learning in individuals, organizations, and communities. Examples might include creating supportive environments that encourage experimentation, feedback, and reflection; developing capacities for managing emotions, conflicts, and dilemmas; and nurturing a sense of shared responsibility, trust, and empathy among diverse stakeholders (Westley, Zimmerman, & Patton, 2006; Senge, 1990).

Unmasking the myth of control is of significant importance, as it unveils the limitations of control and offers alternative perspectives on how to cultivate safe uncertainty in an increasingly complex and interconnected world. By exploring the cognitive, psychological, social, and cultural dimensions of the myth of control, researchers and practitioners can contribute to the development of innovative and transformative approaches that enhance the well-being, resilience, and adaptability of individuals and societies.

By continuing to explore alternative perspectives aimed at increasing safe uncertainty, it is essential to recognize the importance of interdisciplinary and integrative approaches that can bridge the gaps between different fields of knowledge, methodologies, and practices. For instance, insights drawn from the philosophy of mind, psychoanalytic history, and clinical psychology, can provide valuable conceptual tools and frameworks for understanding the myth of control and its implications for individual and collective well-being.

Moreover, the study of the myth of control can benefit from dialogues and collaborations between academic researchers, practitioners, policymakers, and community members, who can bring diverse perspectives, experiences, and expertise to the table (Reason & Bradbury, 2001). By engaging in participatory and action-oriented research, it is possible to co-create contextually relevant and culturally sensitive solutions that empower individuals and communities to navigate the challenges and opportunities of an uncertain world (Lewin, 1946; Freire, 1970). But perhaps the real significance of the myth of control perhaps lies in its inherent potential to illuminate the limitations of control and to inspire alternative perspectives on how to foster safer approaches to uncertainty in a complex, interconnected, and rapidly changing world.

II. Historical Context

1. Influence of Enlightenment philosophy

The Enlightenment period, spanning the 17th and 18th centuries, wove a rich curtain of thought that further embroidered the myth of control, with threads spun by luminaries such as Immanuel Kant and René Descartes. It was an era that held reason, rationality, and empirical evidence in the highest esteem—primary tools for deciphering the world's cryptic codes and prescribing human action. This intellectual tide set the stage for the modern notion of control, heralding the human capability to fathom, anticipate, and mould both the natural world and the societal landscape.

René Descartes, a French polymath known as the father of modern philosophy, left an indelible mark on this era. His Discourse on the Method (1637) shed light on the potency of systematic, logical, and methodological thinking in unearthing elemental objective truths about the world (Descartes, 1637). The famous dictum, “Cogito, ergo sum” forms the cornerstone of Cartesian philosophy, asserting the primacy of individual consciousness and rationality as the first principle in the quest for knowledge and certainty. Yet his more contentious dualistic worldview, cleaving reality into a material realm governed by deterministic physical laws, and a mental realm inhabited by the rational, autonomous human mind, solidified the belief that humans can command their environment through reason and scientific inquiry alone.

Meanwhile, the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, in his work Critique of Pure Reason (1781), offered a unique perspective that subtly nurtured the myth of control. By suggesting that human knowledge is sculpted through an intricate dance of a priori (innate) categories of understanding and a posteriori (empirical) experience, Kant set out to bridge the chasm between the rationalist and empiricist traditions (Kant, 1781). Although he conceded the limitations of human reason and the enigma of things-in-themselves (noumena), Kant asserted that humans could acquire knowledge and exert control over the phenomenal world by wielding the principles of logic, mathematics, and natural science.

The influence of Enlightenment philosophy on the myth of control is evident in various ways. First, the emphasis on reason, rationality, and empirical inquiry fostered the development of modern science, technology, and industrialization, which have significantly increased human capacities to predict, manipulate, and exploit the natural world. This progress has generated a sense of mastery and control, albeit often at the expense of environmental sustainability and social equity (Horkheimer & Adorno, 1944). Second, the Enlightenment's individualistic ethos and focus on human autonomy have shaped the modern conception of self-control, self-discipline, and self-determination, which underpin contemporary notions of personal responsibility, meritocracy, and self-improvement (Foucault, 1975). Last, the Enlightenment's emphasis on universalism, secularism, and rationality has contributed to the rise of bureaucratic and technocratic forms of governance, which aim to control and regulate society through systematic planning, standardization, and quantification (Weber, 1922; Rose, 1998).

Enlightenment philosophy, epitomized by the works of Descartes and Kant, has significantly influenced the myth of control by advancing the ideals of reason, rationality, and human autonomy to the detriment of greater scholarship into subjective experience (even though Kant’s (1790) Critique of Judgement completes his critical system, it is often sadly overlooked or largely misunderstood). Nonetheless, these big ideals have contributed to remarkable scientific, technological, and social progress, they have also perpetuated the illusion of control, which has significant psychological, social, and environmental implications.

The impact of Enlightenment philosophy on the myth of control also extends to political and ethical dimensions. The political theories of a social contract, as espoused by thinkers like John Locke (1689) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762), posit that individuals voluntarily relinquish a portion of their autonomy to a governing authority in exchange for the protection and preservation of their natural rights, such as life, liberty, and property. These theories underpin modern liberal democracies, which are predicated on the idea of controlling and managing society through representative government, the rule of law, and constitutional checks and balances.

Moreover, Enlightenment ethics, most notably Kant’s deontological ethics (1785), emphasize the importance of rationality, autonomy, and universal moral principles in guiding human action. Kant’s categorical imperative, which requires individuals to act according to maxims that can be consistently and universally applied, reflects a belief in the capacity of human reason to control and regulate moral behaviour. This ethical framework has profoundly influenced modern notions of justice, rights, and moral responsibility, which are central to contemporary debates about social control, state power, and individual freedom (Rawls, 1971).

However, the myth of control, as informed by Enlightenment philosophy, has also been subject to various critiques and challenges. Postmodern and poststructuralist thinkers, such as Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Gilles Deleuze, have questioned the Enlightenment’s faith in reason, autonomy, and universality, highlighting the contingent, constructed, and power-laden nature of knowledge, subjectivity, and social order (Foucault, 1966; Derrida, 1967; Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). These critiques invite a rethinking of control and a re-examination of alternative epistemologies, ontologies, and ethics that embrace complexity, diversity, and uncertainty.

The influence of Enlightenment philosophy on the myth of control is multifaceted and far-reaching, shaping various aspects of modern thought, culture, and society, from science and technology to politics and ethics. While the Enlightenment legacy has undoubtedly contributed to human progress and empowerment, it has also perpetuated the illusion of control with significant psychological, social, and ecological consequences. By engaging with the critiques and challenges posed by post-Enlightenment thinkers, it is possible to develop more nuanced, reflexive, and adaptive perspectives on control and its limitations in an increasingly complex and interconnected world.

As we continue to examine the influence of Enlightenment philosophy on the myth of control, it is essential to consider the ways in which this legacy can be critically engaged and creatively reimagined in contemporary contexts. By drawing upon insights from various intellectual traditions, disciplines, and cultural perspectives, it is possible to develop more inclusive, pluralistic, and adaptive approaches to understanding and addressing the challenges and opportunities associated with the myth of control. For instance, insights from feminist, ecological, and indigenous epistemologies can provide valuable critiques of the Enlightenment’s anthropocentrism, dualism, and reductionism and offer alternative conceptions of knowledge, ethics, and agency that foreground relationality, interconnectedness, and co-evolution (Merchant, 1980; Plumwood, 1993; Cajete, 2000). By embracing these alternative perspectives, individuals and societies can cultivate a greater sense of humility, empathy, and responsibility towards the natural world and one another, fostering a more sustainable, equitable, and compassionate form of control.

Moreover, insights from complexity science, systems thinking, and resilience theory can help to challenge the myth of control by highlighting the non-linear, emergent, and self-organizing nature of human and natural systems (Capra, 1996; Holland, 1998; Mason, 1993; Walker & Salt, 2006). These perspectives can inform the design of policies, institutions, and practices that enhance the adaptive capacity, learning, and innovation of individuals, communities, and societies in the face of uncertainty, change, and surprise (Westley et al., 2006; Senge, 1990). Further, the study of the myth of control can benefit from dialogues and collaborations between different intellectual, artistic, and spiritual traditions, such as Eastern philosophy, existentialism, and contemporary art, which can offer alternative visions of control, freedom, and meaning that embraces paradox, ambiguity, and impermanence (Nagarjuna, 2nd century CE; Sartre, 1943; Bourriaud, 2009). By engaging in these intercultural and interdisciplinary encounters, it is possible to enrich our collective imagination, foster a deeper appreciation of diversity, and cultivate a more profound sense of humility and wonder in the face of the unknown.

2. Development of the modern concept of control

The contemporary rendition of control is a fascinating prism, refracted and reformed by the relentless march of science and technology. These twin torchbearers of progress have not only etched a deeper understanding of the natural world into our collective consciousness but have also equipped us with an unprecedented capacity to sculpt it. Peter Galison, a noted historian, and philosopher of science, illuminates this symbiosis between scientific knowledge and technological innovation, highlighting its profound impact on the course of the modern world (Galison, 1990). It is as though we stand on the brink of a chasm, peering into an abyss of possibilities, where our understanding and manipulation of reality are bounded only by the extent of our knowledge and the tools at our disposal.

The Scientific Revolution, a period of rapid scientific discovery and development in the 16th and 17th centuries, laid the groundwork for the modern understanding of control. Thinkers such as Copernicus, Galileo, and Newton revolutionized our understanding of the cosmos, introducing mathematical frameworks and empirical methods that enabled more accurate predictions of celestial and terrestrial phenomena (Kuhn, 1957). This shift towards a mechanistic and deterministic view of the universe encouraged the belief that humans could understand, predict, and control the natural world through the application of scientific principles and the development of new technologies (Merton, 1938).

In the 18th and 19th centuries, the Industrial Revolution marked a significant turning point in human history, as advances in science and technology-fuelled unprecedented economic growth and social change. Innovations in energy production, transportation, and manufacturing transformed the ways humans interacted with the environment and each other, reinforcing the idea of control over nature and society (Landes, 1969). The development of steam engines, railroads, and mechanized factories, among other technological breakthroughs, exemplified the power of human ingenuity to harness and control natural resources and physical processes to meet human needs and desires (Smil, 2005).

In the 20th century, the rise of computer science and information technology further expanded the scope of human control. The invention of digital computers and the development of algorithms, programming languages, and telecommunications networks revolutionized the ways humans process, store, and communicate information, enabling unprecedented levels of control over complex systems and processes (Ceruzzi, 2003). The advent of the internet, artificial intelligence, and big data analytics has further extended the reach of human control, facilitating global connectivity, real-time monitoring, and predictive modelling of a wide range of social, economic, and environmental phenomena (Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier, 2013).

Throughout the development of modern science and technology, the concept of control has been closely intertwined with cultural, political, and economic factors. As Galison (1990) observes, the emergence of new scientific disciplines and technological innovations often reflects and reinforces broader social values, priorities, and power relations. For example, the growth of disciplines such as nuclear physics, cybernetics, and systems engineering in the mid-20th century was closely associated with the military-industrial complex and the Cold War, reflecting the societal preoccupation with security, control, and rational planning (Hughes, 1983; Edwards, 1996).

The modern concept of the myth of control has been significantly shaped by advances in science and technology, from the Scientific and Industrial Revolutions to the digital age. These developments have expanded human capacities to understand, predict, and manipulate the natural and social world, generating a sense of mastery and a mask of control. However, the pursuit of control through science and technology also raises ethical, social, and environmental challenges that call for reflection, critique and the exploration of alternative perspectives on the limits and possibilities of control in an increasingly complex and interconnected world.

3. Shift from external to internal control (Foucault, 1975)

The metamorphosis from the domination of external control to the ascendancy of internal control reveals a striking evolution in the comprehension and implementation of power and authority within the patterning of modern societies. This shift has been intricately dissected by the French philosopher and social theorist Michel Foucault in his intriguing work, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (1975). Here, Foucault embarked on a journey tracing the historical lineage of disciplinary techniques, shedding light on their profound implications on the mechanisms of governance and control over individuals and populations (Foucault, 1975).

In eras preceding our own, control was often articulated through external, palpable, and frequently merciless mechanisms—public executions, torture, and corporal punishment served as the grim tools of the trade. These chilling demonstrations of control, instruments of deterrence, were potent symbols of sovereign power, reinforcing the hierarchy and authority of the ruling class (Foucault, 1975). Nevertheless, as Foucault eloquently elucidates, these conspicuous methods of control gradually gave way to more nuanced, internalised, and normalising mechanisms of discipline. These subtle instruments of control operate not only on the tangible body but penetrate the intangible recesses of the mind and soul, quietly recalibrating the individual from within (Foucault, 1975).

This seismic shift towards internal control is intertwined with several concurrent phenomena, including the ascension of the modern state, the birth of novel institutions such as prisons, schools, and hospitals, and the blossoming of scientific discourses and practices, including psychology, criminology, and medicine (Foucault, 1975). These transformative undercurrents mirror and magnify the burgeoning emphasis on rationality, efficiency, and productivity, all deemed indispensable for the maintenance of social order and the pursuit of progress (Foucault, 1977).

One of the key techniques of internal control identified by Foucault is the panopticon, a prison design proposed by the English philosopher and social reformer Jeremy Bentham (1791). The panopticon is characterized by its central observation tower, which allows for the constant surveillance of inmates, who are housed in individual cells arranged in a circular fashion around the tower. The panopticon’s architectural design creates a state of uncertainty and self-regulation among inmates, as they are unable to determine when they are being observed and thus must always behave as if they are under surveillance (Foucault, 1975).

According to Foucault, the panopticon serves as a metaphor for the modern disciplinary society, in which individuals are subjected to constant observation, evaluation, and normalization through various institutional and social mechanisms (Foucault, 1975). This process of internalization results in a form of self-surveillance and self-discipline, whereby individuals internalize the norms, values, and expectations of society and regulate their own behaviour accordingly (Foucault, 1982).

The shift from external to internal control has significant implications for our understanding of power, freedom, and subjectivity in contemporary societies. As Foucault (1975) contends, the internalization of control represents a more insidious and pervasive form of domination, as it operates not only through the imposition of constraints but also through the production of docile, obedient, and self-regulating subjects. This analysis challenges traditional notions of power as a top-down, repressive force and invites a more nuanced and critical exploration of the ways in which power is exercised, resisted, and negotiated in everyday life (Foucault, 1980). The shift from external to internal control, as elucidated by the mercurial Foucault, reflects a profound transformation in the dynamics of power, authority, and subjectivity in modern societies.

III. The Philosophy of Mind and the Illusion of Control

1.     Connecting Mind and Control

When we venture, red thread in hand, into the maze of the mind's relationship with control, we navigate a landscape riddled with profound philosophical questions that prod at the very essence of consciousness, agency, and our sense of self. As we grapple with these existential quandaries, we find a compelling guide in the American philosopher Daniel Dennett, whose illuminating work Consciousness Explained (1991) presents a synthesis of insights drawn from the realms of cognitive science, psychology, and artificial intelligence.

Dennett unfurls his theory of consciousness, the “multiple drafts” model, which elegantly posits that our subjective experience of reality is a tapestry woven through an incessant, parallel, and distributed process of interpretation and representation within the cerebral chambers of the brain (Dennett, 1991). From this perspective, the mind does not house a single, unified, or privileged “control centre”, a throne from which a royal 'self' reigns. Instead, control surfaces like an emergent property from the intricate dance of countless cognitive processes and sub-processes, each operating at different levels of abstraction, on varying time scales, and with differing degrees of awareness (Dennett, 1991).

The 'multiple drafts' model gently nudges us towards a startling revelation, one that undermines our traditional understanding of control: our sense of agency and selfhood, the linchpin of our personal narratives, is largely a mirage, or as Dennett playfully labels it, a “user-illusion” (Dennett, 1991). This unsettling proposition throws into disarray the traditional Cartesian tableau, wherein the self is depicted as a distinct, unified, and persistent entity that exerts control over thoughts and actions from its privileged vantage point (Descartes, 1637). Instead, Dennett invites us to reimagine our experience of selfhood and agency as the product of a narrative construction, wherein myriad cognitive processes jostle for attention and influence, coalescing into a coherent and plausible story that we retroactively assign to a unified “self” (Dennett, 1991).

The decorative weave of mind and control, as unravelled by Dennett, has profound implications for our understanding of human agency, responsibility, and freedom. By framing control within a dynamic, distributed, and non-hierarchical schema, the 'multiple drafts' model beckons us to re-evaluate our notions of human autonomy and self-determination in the light of contemporary scientific insights and technological breakthroughs (Dennett, 2003). It paints a portrait of control that is richly nuanced and contextually embedded, acknowledging the role of environmental, social, and cultural factors in moulding the development, operation, and expression of our cognitive processes and abilities (Clark, 1997).

In his interesting work on human consciousness, Dennett (1991) crafts an account of profound coherence, painting consciousness with a reductionist palette, asserting that the grand complexity of consciousness can be deconstructed to the physical processes and computational states within the cerebral theatre of the brain. However, this rendition of consciousness finds itself on the receiving end of critical scrutiny, particularly from distinguished figures such as Max Velmans (2000) and David Chalmers (1995).

Velmans, in his acclaimed work Understanding Consciousness (2000), questions Dennett's reductionist lens, making a case for a dual-aspect theory of consciousness. He posits that consciousness is a captivating dance between subjective experiences—our first-person perspectives —and objective observations—the third-person perspectives. This dance, he argues, forms the integral and complementary aspects of consciousness. Velmans takes umbrage with Dennett's dismissal of the subjective experience, or what he terms "phenomenal consciousness", asserting that the subjective experience of consciousness is not merely an abstract concept but a fundamental aspect of our reality. Considering this, he suggests that any theory of consciousness that overlooks this dimension is akin to a map that omits a crucial landmark. Consequently, by disregarding the subjective aspect of consciousness, Dennett’s (1991) account risks reducing consciousness to a mere shadow of its vibrant self, perhaps "explaining away" consciousness rather than truly elucidating it.

In a similar vein, Chalmers (1995), in his seminal paper Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness, introduced a compelling distinction between the 'easy' and the 'hard' problem of consciousness. The former pertains to the functional and computational aspects of consciousness, including cognition and perception, which can be elucidated in the language of physical processes. The latter, however, grapples with the more elusive and perplexing territory of the subjective experience or qualia of consciousness, a domain that resists reduction to mere physical processes. Chalmers critiques Dennett’s (1991) approach for merging these two distinct issues into one, implying that elucidating the easy problem is equivalent to explaining consciousness in its entirety. This critique suggests a fundamental flaw in Dennett's account, pointing out its inability to grapple with the hard problem, thereby neglecting the most intriguing and essential facet of consciousness.

While Dennett's charming narrative for the functional, emergent, and computational aspects of consciousness (1991, 2003) offered a compelling argument, its reductionist approach and relegation of the subjective experience of consciousness have been met with critique by Velmans and Chalmers. These counterpoints underscore the need for a more comprehensive, integrative, and phenomenologically grounded theory of consciousness that acknowledges and explains both its objective and subjective dimensions. This void in the explanation or definition of the subjective experience of consciousness compels us to engage with traditional philosophical assumptions critically and to craft new frameworks and insights that resonate more deeply with the importance of a dual-aspect theory of consciousness, given the intricate complexity, diversity, and fluidity in our mental lives and social worlds.

Research on consciousness and control is a burgeoning field, drawing from disciplines such as neuroscience, psychology, philosophy, and even artificial intelligence. Several contemporary studies focus on understanding the nature of conscious control, specifically the extent to which our consciousness directs our actions versus the idea that consciousness might merely be a post-hoc rationalisation of actions already determined by unconscious processes (Soon et al., 2008). This line of research, often referred to as the study of ‘free will’, has major implications for our understanding of moral and legal responsibility.

Another burgeoning area of research pertains to the role of consciousness in decision-making processes. This research often centres on the ‘global workspace theory’ (Bars, 1988; Dehaene et al., 2017), which posits that consciousness acts as a kind of ‘theatre’ where information from various unconscious cognitive processes is brought together, allowing for the integration of information and consequently more flexible and adaptive decision-making.

Research in the field of psychopathology has also provided intriguing insights into the relationship between consciousness and control. Studies on conditions such as obsessive-compulsive disorder and addiction have revealed disruptions in the conscious control of thoughts and behaviours, suggesting that these conditions may be associated with abnormalities in the brain regions involved in executive control and self-regulation (Milad & Rauch, 2012; Koob & Volkow, 2016).

The advent of advanced neuroimaging techniques and artificial intelligence has opened new avenues for exploring the neural correlates of consciousness and control. Researchers are increasingly using techniques such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and machine learning algorithms to identify the brain networks associated with conscious control and to predict individuals’ decisions based on their brain activity (Haynes, 2011).

Despite these advances, several questions remain unanswered. For example, the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness – explaining how subjective experiences arise from physical processes – continues to elude researchers. Similarly, the question of how to measure consciousness, both in healthy individuals and in patients with disorders of consciousness, remains a significant challenge (Seth, 2020).

While significant strides have been made in understanding the relationship between consciousness as such and control, there remains much more to discover. Future research, armed with increasingly sophisticated methods—using LLM+, with alignment resolved to some satisfactory degree, to assist with researching the hard problem(?)—promises to shed further light on these profound and complex phenomena.

2.     The role of heuristics in shaping the perception of control

The role of heuristics in shaping the perception of control is a critical aspect of cognitive psychology and decision-making research, as it highlights the ways in which our intuitive judgments and mental shortcuts can influence our understanding and experience of control. The pioneering work of Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman in the early 1970s significantly advanced our knowledge of this phenomenon, demonstrating the prevalence and persistence of heuristics in human cognition (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).

Heuristics are cognitive shortcuts that enable individuals to make quick and efficient decisions by simplifying complex information and reducing the cognitive load (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Although heuristics can be highly adaptive and effective in many situations, they can also lead to systematic biases and errors in judgment, particularly when they are applied inappropriately or uncritically (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982).

One of the key heuristics related to the perception of control is the availability heuristic, which involves judging the likelihood or frequency of an event based on the ease with which relevant instances come to mind (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). This heuristic can contribute to an inflated sense of control, as individuals may overestimate their ability to predict, manage, or influence outcomes that are easily accessible or salient in memory while underestimating the role of chance, uncertainty, or external factors (Langer, 1975).

Another relevant heuristic is the representativeness heuristic, which involves judging the probability of an event or the truth of a hypothesis based on the degree to which it resembles or conforms to a stereotype or prototype (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). This heuristic can also distort the perception of control, as individuals may erroneously infer causal connections or patterns from random or unrelated events based on superficial similarities or coincidences (Gilovich, Vallone, & Tversky, 1985).

The role of heuristics in shaping the perception of control has important implications for our understanding of human decision-making, risk assessment, and well-being. By revealing the cognitive mechanisms and biases that underlie our intuitive judgments, the study of heuristics can help to inform the development of strategies, interventions, and policies that promote more accurate, adaptive, and reflective forms of control in various domains of life (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011).

The research on heuristics, particularly as exemplified by the work of Tversky and Kahneman, offers valuable insights into the ways in which our cognitive processes and biases can shape and constrain our perception of control.

3.     Overconfidence and self-serving biases

Psychological constructs such as overconfidence and self-serving biases significantly fuel the illusion of control. These biases are reflective of an individual's propensity to harbour excessively positive and self-boosting beliefs regarding their capabilities, accomplishments, and future opportunities, thereby inflating their sense of control and skewing their perception of reality (Taylor & Brown, 1988).

Overconfidence encapsulates the systematic over-assessment of one's knowledge, competencies, or the likelihood of success across various life sectors (Taylor & Brown, 1988). This bias can take several shapes, including overestimation (the belief that one outshines others), overplacement (ranking oneself higher than one's actual performance merits), and overprecision (excessive certainty regarding the correctness of one's beliefs) (Moore & Healy, 2008). Overconfidence can breed a deceptive sense of control, causing individuals to think they can forecast, handle, or sway events and outcomes more effectively than their actual abilities permit (Langer, 1975).

Conversely, the self-serving bias entails attributing positive outcomes to one's abilities or efforts, while associating negative outcomes with external elements or circumstances (Miller & Ross, 1975). This bias functions as a defence mechanism to safeguard and enhance self-esteem and uphold a positive self-image in the face of setbacks or failures (Taylor & Brown, 1988). The self-serving bias strengthens the illusion of control by reinforcing the perception of personal agency and mastery, even when evidence points to the fact that outcomes are predominantly influenced by chance, fortune, or other external factors (Langer, 1975).

The relationship between overconfidence, self-serving biases, and the myth of control has been extensively investigated in various fields, including social psychology, cognitive psychology, and behavioural economics (Taylor & Brown, 1988; Dunning & Kruger, 1999). One of the key findings from this research is that these biases are pervasive, resilient, and largely unconscious, suggesting that they may serve important psychological functions or adaptive purposes (Taylor & Brown, 1988).

For instance, Taylor and Brown (1988) argue that positive illusions, such as overconfidence and self-serving biases, can promote mental health, well-being, and motivation by buffering individuals against the adverse effects of stress, uncertainty, and self-doubt. However, these biases can also have detrimental consequences, as they can impair judgment, decision-making, and interpersonal relations, as well as perpetuate the myth of control (Dunning & Kruger, 1999).

Overconfidence and self-serving biases play a crucial role in sustaining the myth of control by promoting an inflated and illusory sense of personal agency and mastery.

IV. Psychoanalytic Perspectives

1.     Unconscious processes and the experience of control

Our experience of control is profoundly shaped by unconscious processes, which subtly and often surprisingly influence our thoughts, emotions, and actions beyond the realm of our conscious awareness. The exploration of these unconscious processes and their relationship to our perception of control has been a key emphasis in various psychological theories and research fields, including psychoanalysis, cognitive psychology, and social psychology (Freud, 1923; Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Hassin et al., 2005).

Research in this area has revealed that our sense of control is not solely shaped by conscious and deliberate processes. Instead, it is also moulded by automatic and non-conscious processes, which occasionally operate in counterintuitive ways beneath our conscious radar (Bargh & Morsella, 2008). These processes can be activated by a variety of cues, including social norms, environmental factors, or priming stimuli, and they can exert a significant impact on our behaviours and attitudes. Intriguingly, these effects can often contradict our explicit beliefs or intentions (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999).

For example, studies have shown that priming people with words related to achievement, such as “win,” “compete,” or “succeed,” can increase their motivation, confidence, and performance on subsequent tasks, even when they are not consciously aware of the influence of the primes (Bargh et al., 2001). Similarly, research on the “mere exposure effect” has shown that people tend to prefer stimuli that they have been exposed to repeatedly, even if they cannot consciously recall seeing them before, suggesting that familiarity can enhance the perceived sense of control and predictability (Bornstein, 1989).

The role of unconscious processes in shaping the experience of control challenges the traditional view of control as a conscious, intentional, and rational process that is largely within our volitional control (Langer, 1975). Instead, this view suggests that our sense of control is deeply embedded in our unconscious cognitive and affective processes and that it can be influenced by a wide range of external and internal factors that operate beyond our conscious control (Bargh & Morsella, 2008).

Moreover, the study of unconscious processes and the experience of control highlights the importance of adopting a more nuanced, contextual, and ecological approach to understanding human behaviour and cognition (Hassin et al., 2005). This approach recognizes the dynamic and reciprocal relationship between individuals and their environment and emphasizes the need to consider the multiple, interacting, and often conflicting factors that shape our sense of control and agency in different contexts and situations (Langer, 1975). The study of unconscious processes and their relationship to the experience of control offers a valuable perspective on the complexity, diversity, and situatedness of human cognition and behaviour.

2.     The impact of early childhood experiences on perceived control

Experiences during early childhood profoundly shape the formation and perception of control in subsequent stages of life. This influence is especially noticeable during the initial few years of existence, a time when the brain is rapidly maturing, and the bedrock of personal agency, personality, and attachment is being established (Bowlby, 1969; Ainsworth et al., 1978).

Studies indicate that children who enjoy secure attachment bonds with their primary caregivers are more likely to cultivate a sense of self-efficacy, resilience, and effective coping mechanisms (Ainsworth et al., 1978; Bandura, 1997; Winnicott, 1958). These traits can, in turn, boost their perceived control over their surroundings. Conversely, children who experience insecure attachment, neglect, or abuse are more prone to develop feelings of helplessness, fear, and mistrust, which can erode their sense of control and personal agency (Bowlby, 1969; Cicchetti & Lynch, 1993).

Additionally, early childhood experiences can mould how individuals perceive and react to elements of uncertainty, novelty, and ambiguity, all of which are vital determinants of the experience of control (Langer, 1975). Children raised in a predictable and stable environment with clear boundaries and routines may develop a more rigid and deterministic worldview, which can hinder their adaptability to changing circumstances and tolerance for uncertainty (Schore, 1994). On the other hand, children brought up in a more flexible and exploratory environment, with opportunities for novelty and play, may cultivate a more innovative and adaptive worldview, thus enhancing their capacity for self-regulation and problem-solving (Langer, 1975).

The impact of early childhood experiences on perceived control has been further elaborated in various developmental theories, such as attachment theory, social learning theory, emotional development, and ecological systems theory (Bronfenbrenner, 1979; Bandura, 1997; Winnicott, 1958). These theories highlight the importance of considering the multi-levelled and dynamic nature of human development and the need to consider the interplay between individual, familial, social, and cultural factors that shape the experience of control over time (Bronfenbrenner, 1979).

The impact of early childhood experiences on perceived control is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that has important implications for individual and societal well-being. Understanding the factors that shape the development and perception of control in early life helps to inform more effective and targeted interventions to support children, and their families, who may be at risk of experiencing adverse outcomes in later life.

3.     Defence mechanisms and control

Relational psychoanalytic thought is a perspective that underscores the significance of interpersonal relationships and societal context in shaping both psychological distress and well-being (Mitchell, 1988). From this standpoint, the quest for control and the employment of defence mechanisms are not merely individual occurrences but are also influenced by the dynamics of the therapeutic relationship and the larger social and cultural milieu within which the individual exists (Stolorow et al., 2002).

According to relational psychoanalytic thought, defence mechanisms are not fixed or standalone phenomena, but components of a wider pattern of relating to others. This pattern mirrors the individual's attachment style, developmental history, and cultural identity (Gabbard, 2005). The need for control can manifest itself in a range of relational defence mechanisms, such as projective identification, splitting, or enmeshment, all of which use others as tools to handle the individual's anxiety or distress (Ogden, 2005). For instance, projective identification is a process of unconsciously projecting one's own emotions or characteristics onto another individual and then perceiving these emotions or traits as if they originated from that other individual (Ogden, 2005). This defence mechanism can be interpreted as an attempt to gain control over one's own internal experience by externalizing it onto the other individual and then managing it via that person's reactions.

In a similar fashion, splitting entails segregating the world and the self into starkly contrasted good and bad categories, which are then projected onto others (Gabbard, 2005). This defence mechanism can be viewed as an effort to exert control over one's own experience by simplifying and categorizing it, and subsequently imposing these categories onto another person. This process helps to avoid the complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty inherent in human experience.

Enmeshment involves blurring the boundaries between oneself and the other person and then depending on the other person for emotional regulation and validation (Mitchell, 1988). This defence mechanism can be seen as an attempt to exert control over one’s own experience by merging with the other person and then relying on them for a sense of stability, continuity, and identity.

The use of relational defence mechanisms can have important implications for therapeutic work, as it can challenge the therapist’s own sense of control and boundaries and require a more nuanced and reflective approach to the therapeutic relationship (Stolorow et al., 2002). Moreover, the need for control and the use of relational defence mechanisms can be seen as reflections of broader social and cultural factors, such as gender norms, power differentials, or social injustice, which shape the experience of control and vulnerability in contemporary society (Chodorow, 1992).

Therefore, a relational psychoanalytic approach to the need for control and the use of defence mechanisms requires a broad and contextual view that considers the dynamic and interactive nature of human experience and the role of social and cultural factors in shaping it.

4.     Intellectualisation and rationalisation as means of maintaining control

Intellectualization and rationalization are two psychological defence mechanisms that are used to manage anxiety and maintain a sense of control over one’s experience (Freud, 1894). These defence mechanisms involve the use of cognitive processes, such as analysis, abstraction, or generalization, to distance oneself from emotional or interpersonal experiences and to construct a sense of order and predictability in the face of uncertainty or ambiguity.

Intellectualization involves the use of abstract or technical language to describe emotions, experiences, or events in order to reduce their emotional impact or to avoid the need for interpersonal engagement (Freud, 1894). This defence mechanism can be seen as an attempt to exert control over one’s own internal experience by using cognitive processes to regulate or suppress emotional or affective aspects of experience.

Rationalization involves the use of logical or moral arguments to justify or explain one’s own behaviour or emotions in order to reduce the discomfort of cognitive dissonance or moral conflict (Freud, 1894). This defence mechanism can be seen as an attempt to exert control over one’s external environment by using cognitive processes to rationalize or legitimize one’s own behaviour or emotions, and thus reducing the need for interpersonal engagement or self-reflection.

Intellectualization and rationalization can be effective in reducing anxiety or stress in the short term, by providing a sense of control or order in the face of uncertainty or ambiguity. However, the excessive or rigid use of these defence mechanisms can have negative consequences for mental health and well-being, by limiting the individual’s capacity for emotional openness, interpersonal intimacy, or self-awareness (Vaillant, 1977).

Moreover, the need for control that underlies intellectualization and rationalization can lead to a range of maladaptive behaviours and attitudes, such as intellectual arrogance, dogmatism, or avoidance of emotional experience, which can undermine the individual’s ability to adapt to changing circumstances and to cope with stress (Flett et al., 2011).

Therefore, a more balanced and integrated approach to the need for control requires a combination of cognitive and emotional processes, as well as interpersonal engagement and self-reflection, that allows the individual to manage uncertainty and ambiguity while maintaining a sense of coherence and authenticity (Stolorow et al., 2002). A relational and contextual approach to intellectualization and rationalization can help to identify the social and cultural factors that shape these defence mechanisms, and to promote a more compassionate and reflective approach to mental health and well-being.

V. Structuralism, Semiology, and the Social Construction of Control

1.     Saussure’s structuralist approach to language

Ferdinand de Saussure, a Swiss linguist, is renowned for his pioneering work in the field of structuralism, particularly his theory of the structure of language. In his influential book, Course in General Linguistics (1916), which was compiled posthumously from his lecture notes by his students Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye, Saussure outlined the basic tenets of his structural approach to language.

Saussure proposed a dualistic model of linguistic signs, which he believed were comprised of two inseparable components: the signifier (the sound or written form) and the signified (the concept or meaning). He argued that the relationship between the signifier and the signified was arbitrary, as it is not dictated by any inherent connection but by the conventions of a given linguistic community (Saussure, 1916, p. 67).

One of the central tenets of Saussure’s structuralism is the notion of the linguistic system as a synchronic entity, meaning that it is studied at a particular point in time, rather than diachronically, which involves an analysis of the historical development of language. By focusing on the synchronic aspect, Saussure sought to uncover the underlying structure and rules governing the functioning of language (Saussure, 1916, p. 81).

Additionally, Saussure emphasised the importance of the distinction between langue and parole. Langue refers to the abstract system of language, comprising the rules and conventions shared by the members of a linguistic community, while parole pertains to the individual instances of language use (Saussure, 1916, p. 9). This distinction allowed Saussure to concentrate on the systematic and rule-bound nature of language as a structure, rather than the idiosyncrasies of individual speech acts.

Saussure’s structural approach to language has been subject to various critiques, one of which is the charge of excessive formalism. Critics, such as Noam Chomsky, argue that Saussure’s focus on the formal properties of language and the synchronic aspect neglects the rich, dynamic, and creative aspects of language use (Chomsky, 1957).

Furthermore, some scholars have criticised the arbitrary nature of the sign, as proposed by Saussure. For example, cognitive linguists such as George Lakoff and Mark Johnson argue that the connection between the signifier and the signified is not entirely arbitrary, as it is often grounded in our bodily experiences and the environment (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980).

Saussure’s structural approach to language has significantly influenced the development of linguistics and semiotics, offering a novel perspective on the study of language as a system. This approach has also faced critiques for its formalism and the alleged arbitrariness of the linguistic sign.

2.     The role of multiple connotations in constructing the concept of control

We like to think that we oversee our lives, and that we can shape the world according to our wishes. But this is a fantasy, a myth of control that we tell ourselves to make sense of our existence. The myth of control has two aspects: what it says, and what it implies. What it says is that we have the power to control everything that matters to us: nature, society, ourselves. We use words and ideas that suggest certainty, stability, and order. What it implies is that control has different meanings for different people, depending on their culture, history, and situation. Control can be a virtue or a vice, a sign of skill or of tyranny, a source of comfort or of anxiety (Fiske, 1989). The myth of control is not a simple statement, but a complex web of associations, connotations, or interpretations.

We are fascinated by stories and images that show us how we can control our lives and the world around us. In our culture, we have many examples of this: the myth of Prometheus, who stole fire from the gods and gave it to humans, showing our defiance of nature and its dangers (Hesiod, 8th century BCE); the idea of the ‘self-made’ person, who achieves success by their own efforts and choices, ignoring the influence of society and chance (Weber, 1905). These stories and images tell us what control means, but they also imply different things to different people. Control can be a gift or a curse, a challenge or a burden, a dream, or a nightmare. The myth of control is something fluid, it is not a fixed idea but a flexible idea that changes with time and place. This is because the words and signs we use to express it are not tied to one meaning, but can have many meanings, as Saussure (1916) and Barthes (1964) showed us. The myth of control is made and remade by the many ways we interpret and communicate it. These ways shape how we see ourselves and our world, and how we try to control them.

3. The impact of social structures on control

3.1 Control as a means of maintaining social order

Social structures of control play a crucial role in maintaining social order, as they facilitate the regulation of human behaviour, the negotiation of power dynamics, and the establishment of norms and values within a given society.

Sociologist Émile Durkheim (1895) emphasised the importance of social cohesion and integration in maintaining social order. He argued that social structures of control, such as laws, norms, and institutions, contribute to the establishment of a collective conscience, which in turn fosters social solidarity and regulates individual behaviour. In this view, social control mechanisms serve to maintain a balance between the needs of the individual and the collective, ensuring the stability and continuity of society.

Max Weber (1922) offered a more nuanced perspective on social structures of control, focusing on the concept of legitimate authority. According to Weber, the maintenance of social order relies on the acceptance of a given system of authority by the members of a society, which can be based on traditional, charismatic, or legal-rational grounds. In this context, social structures of control, such as bureaucracies, laws, and rules, are instrumental in legitimising and sustaining the dominant authority structure, ensuring the compliance of the population.

Michel Foucault (1977) provided a critical analysis of social structures of control, emphasising the role of power dynamics and disciplinary techniques in maintaining social order. He argued that modern societies rely on a complex web of surveillance, discipline, and normalisation, which operate through various institutions, such as schools, prisons, and hospitals, as well as through discourses and practices that shape individual subjectivities. In Foucault’s view, the maintenance of social order is not merely a matter of coercion or imposition but is achieve’ through the subtle and pervasive mechanisms of control that permeate everyday life.

Pierre Bourdieu (1977) further explored the impact of social structures of control by introducing the concept of habitus, which he defined as a set of durable dispositions and tendencies that are internalised by individuals through their socialisation process. Habitus shapes individuals’ actions, perceptions, and interpretations of the social world, thus reproducing the existing social order. In this perspective, social structures of control operate not only through explicit rules and institutions but also through the internalisation of norms and values, which guide individual behaviour and ensure conformity to the established social order.

The impact of social structures of control on maintaining social order is multifaceted, involving the regulation of individual behaviour, the negotiation of power dynamics, and the establishment of norms and values within a society. Theoretical perspectives provided by Durkheim, Weber, Foucault, and Bourdieu offer valuable insights into the mechanisms through which these structures of control function, highlighting the importance of social cohesion, legitimate authority, disciplinary techniques, and habitus in ensuring the stability and continuity of social order.

3.2. The role of patriarchy, hegemony, or institutions in perpetuating control narratives

Control narratives, which reinforce the belief in the possibility and desirability of exerting control over various aspects of life, are perpetuated through various social mechanisms, including patriarchy, hegemony, and institutions.

Patriarchy, a social system characterised by the dominance of men and the subordination of women, has been instrumental in perpetuating control narratives, particularly in the realm of gender relations. Feminist scholars such as Simone de Beauvoir (1949) and Kate Millett (1970) have argued that patriarchy functions as a system of control, legitimising male power and control over women through the construction of gender roles, norms, and expectations that naturalise and justify women’s subordination. In this context, patriarchy perpetuates control narratives by reinforcing the belief that male dominance is natural, inevitable, and desirable, shaping not only the relationships between men and women but also the ways in which individuals perceive and enact their gender identities.

Hegemony, a concept developed by Antonio Gramsci (1971) to describe the cultural and ideological dominance of one social group over others, is another mechanism through which control narratives are perpetuated. According to Gramsci, hegemony is maintained through the production and dissemination of ideologies, values, and beliefs that serve the interests of the dominant group and are accepted as common sense or natural by the subordinate groups. In this way, hegemony perpetuates control narratives by shaping the collective consciousness and consensus, ensuring the compliance and consent of the subordinated groups to the existing social order.

Institutions, as social structures, and organisations that regulate human behaviour and interactions, also play a significant role in perpetuating control narratives. Sociologist Erving Goffman (1961) analysed the functioning of total institutions, such as prisons, asylums, and military barracks, and highlighted their role in controlling and disciplining individuals through strict routines, surveillance, and the enforcement of norms and rules. Moreover, Michel Foucault (1977) demonstrated how institutions, such as schools and hospitals, operate as sites of power and control, disseminating disciplinary techniques and normalising discourses that shape individual subjectivities and behaviours. In this perspective, institutions perpetuate control narratives by embedding them within the social fabric, rendering them an integral part of everyday life and experience.

Patriarchy, hegemony, and institutions play crucial roles in perpetuating control narratives, ensuring the reproduction and reinforcement of these narratives within various social contexts. Through the construction of gender roles and norms, the dissemination of dominant ideologies and values, and the regulation of individual behaviour, these mechanisms might contribute to the maintenance of social order and the perpetuation of control narratives that certainly shape our understanding and perception of power and control in society.

VI. The Limitations of Control and Alternative Perspectives

1.     The incoherence of complete control

We are haunted by the idea that we cannot control our lives and the world around us. This idea has a long history, going back to the ancient Greeks, who believed that human fate was decided by forces beyond our reach (Homer, 8th century BCE). This idea has taken different shapes over time, from the Christian notion of predestination, which claimed that God had already determined our destiny (Augustine, 5th century CE), to the God-is-Nature philosophy of Spinoza (1677), who thought that human actions were the result of a complex chain of causes and effects that made free will and control a fantasy. This idea contradicts the myth of control, which tells us that we can control everything that matters to us. It makes us question our ability and our desire to control our lives and our world.

In modern times, the incoherence of complete control has been explored from various disciplinary perspectives. In the realm of psychology, for example, the concept of learned helplessness (Seligman, 1975) posits that individuals may develop a sense of powerlessness and lack of control when they repeatedly experience uncontrollable events, leading to passivity and resignation even in situations where control is possible. This concept challenges the myth of control by demonstrating that individuals’ perceptions of control can be significantly influenced by their past experiences and psychological processes, which may not always reflect the actual extent of their control over events.

In the field of sociology, scholars such as Zygmunt Bauman (2000) have argued that the contemporary era, characterised by globalisation, fluidity, and uncertainty, has led to the erosion of traditional structures and sources of control, resulting in the increasing fragmentation and individualisation of society. In this context, the myth of control is challenged by the growing recognition that many aspects of life, from economic and political dynamics to social relationships and identities, are subject to forces that elude human mastery and predictability.

Complexity theory, which has emerged in recent decades as an interdisciplinary approach to understanding complex systems and phenomena, offers further insights into the impossibility of control (Waldrop, 1992). This theory posits that complex systems, such as ecosystems, economies, or societies, are characterised by nonlinearity, self-organisation, and emergence, which render their behaviour inherently unpredictable and uncontrollable. In this view, the myth of control is challenged by the recognition that the world is governed by complex, dynamic, and often chaotic processes that defy human attempts to impose order and control.

The impossibility of control serves as a potent counterpoint to the myth of control, drawing on a rich array of philosophical, psychological, sociological, and scientific perspectives that challenge the belief in human mastery over various aspects of life. By highlighting the limitations and contingencies of human agency, these perspectives invite us to reconsider the nature of control and to explore alternative ways of engaging with a world that is not where we are but atop the next hill.

2.     Chaos theory and the quantum limits of predictability

Chaos theory and quantum mechanics, both ground-breaking developments in scientific understanding, have significantly challenged traditional notions of predictability and control. Chaos theory, a branch of mathematics that emerged in the second half of the 20th century, focuses on the behaviour of nonlinear dynamical systems that are sensitive to initial conditions (Lorenz, 1963). This sensitivity, commonly known as the “butterfly effect”, implies that even minuscule differences in initial conditions can lead to radically divergent outcomes over time, rendering long-term prediction virtually impossible in many complex systems, such as weather patterns, ecological systems, and certain social phenomena (Gleick, 1987). Chaos theory thus challenges the classical deterministic view of the world, which assumes that precise knowledge of initial conditions and governing laws can enable accurate prediction of future states.

Quantum mechanics, a foundational theory in modern physics, also has profound implications for predictability and control. Developed in the early 20th century, quantum mechanics describes the behaviour of matter and energy at microscopic scales, where classical Newtonian mechanics no longer apply (Planck, 1900). One of the most striking features of quantum mechanics is the inherent uncertainty and indeterminism at the quantum level, encapsulated by Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle (Heisenberg, 1927). This principle states that it is impossible to simultaneously measure the position and momentum of a particle with arbitrary precision, thus setting fundamental limits on our ability to predict the behaviour of quantum systems.

Moreover, the phenomenon of quantum entanglement, first described by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (1935) in their famous “EPR paradox”, adds another layer of complexity to the quantum limits of predictability. Quantum entanglement implies that the properties of two or more particles can become instantaneously correlated, regardless of the distance between them, defying classical notions of locality and causality. This nonlocal behaviour, later experimentally confirmed by Bell’s theorem (Bell, 1964) and subsequent tests, has led to the development of novel concepts and technologies, such as quantum cryptography and quantum computing, which challenge the limits of classical predictability and control. Chaos theory and quantum mechanics have significantly reshaped our understanding of predictability and control in scientific language.

3.     The role of uncertainty in complex systems

We live in a world of complex systems, where many things are connected and influenced by each other in unexpected and surprising ways. Complex systems can be found everywhere, from nature and society to our minds and bodies. They have a life of their own, with properties and patterns that emerge from their interactions (Waldrop, 1992; Mitchell, 2009). In such systems, we can never be sure what will happen next, because there are many factors that make them unpredictable. Some of these factors are part of the system itself, such as the randomness and variability of its elements, the feedback loops that amplify or dampen its effects, and the dependence on how it started. Some of these factors are beyond the system, such as the limits of our knowledge and perception, and the influence of external events or disturbances. Uncertainty is not a flaw or a mistake, but a feature and a challenge of complex systems.

We are often surprised and puzzled by the behaviour of complex systems, because they are made of many things that are unpredictable and uncertain. These things can be affected by chance, noise, or probability (Allen & Starr, 1982). These effects can spread through the system, making it more or less stable, adaptable, or creative. Uncertainty is not just a problem, but a possibility for complex systems. Sometimes, a tiny change in the beginning can make a huge difference in the end, creating chaos or order (Lorenz, 1963). This means that we can never be sure what will happen next in complex systems. It also means that we need to be careful and flexible when we make decisions or plans about them. We can never know everything about complex systems, because they are too complicated and connected for us to measure and observe (O’Neill, 1989). And we can never see them clearly, because we have our own limitations and prejudices that affect how we think and feel about them (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Uncertainty is not only a fact, but a perspective for complex systems.

The impact of external factors or perturbations, such as environmental changes, technological innovations, or policy interventions, can introduce additional uncertainty in complex systems (Holling, 1973). These perturbations can trigger cascading effects, regime shifts, or tipping points, which can profoundly alter the system’s behaviour and dynamics in ways that are difficult to anticipate or control. In this regard, uncertainty plays a pivotal role in shaping the system’s response to change and its capacity for adaptation and transformation.

4.     Alternative perspectives on control

4.1  The concept of self-organization

The notion of self-organisation, a cardinal principle of complexity science, is the envisioning of a spontaneous birth of order and structure amid complex systems without the reins of external manipulation or management. The heart of self-organisation lies in a process where individual components of a complex system mingle and adapt to each other, sprouting coherent patterns, structures, or behaviours on a grand scale (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984). Like a play unfolding without a script, this process relies heavily on local interactions, feedback loops, and nonlinear dynamics. It is as if these complex systems are involved in a ceaseless conversation, a continuous give-and-take, which results in intricate and resilient patterns of organisation, even in the absence of a centralised authority or a hierarchical blueprint (Camazine et al., 2001). In a world seemingly obsessed with control, self-organisation invites us to consider a universe where order emerges from the ground up, like wildflowers in a meadow, rather than being imposed from the top down. It is a dance of elements that, through their interactions, create a symphony more congruent or robust than any single conductor could hope to achieve.

One of the most well-known examples of self-organisation in nature is the formation of complex patterns and structures in physical and chemical systems, such as the growth of crystals, the Belousov-Zhabotinsky reaction, or the formation of Benard cells in heated fluids (Nicolis & Prigogine, 1977). These phenomena demonstrate how simple rules and local interactions can give rise to highly organised patterns and structures, without the need for external templates or blueprints.

In the realm of biology, self-organisation is a fundamental principle underlying the formation of complex structures, patterns, and behaviours in living organisms, from the molecular level to entire ecosystems (Kauffman, 1993). Examples include the emergence of patterns in animal populations, such as the spatial distribution of trees in a forest or the formation of termite mounds (Ball, 1999), as well as the coordinated behaviour of social insects, such as the foraging and nest-building activities of ants, bees, and termites (Seeley, 1995; Bonabeau et al., 1999).

Self-organisation also plays a crucial role in human social systems, where it manifests in various forms, such as the spontaneous emergence of norms, conventions, or institutions (Axelrod, 1984), the formation of social networks and communities (Watts & Strogatz, 1998), or the development of urban patterns and structures (Batty, 2005). These examples illustrate how self-organisation can give rise to complex and adaptive social systems that are capable of responding to changing conditions and challenges without the need for centralised planning or control.

The concept of self-organisation has profound implications for our understanding of complex systems, as it challenges conventional notions of order, control, and hierarchy. By demonstrating that order and structure can emerge spontaneously from the bottom up, self-organisation suggests that complex systems can exhibit adaptive and resilient properties that are not reducible to their individual components or amenable to top-down control (Holland, 1995). This insight has important implications for various fields, from biology and ecology to urban planning and management, as it highlights the need for a more decentralised view of emergence, and a second-order approach to understanding and managing complex systems and their basis in simple core instruction sets.

4.2  Embracing uncertainty and vulnerability

The myth of control, akin to a cultural heirloom passed through generations, purports that we, as humans, can wield an unwavering dominion over our environment and circumstances, carving out predictability and order. In a world where complexity and uncertainty are the only constants, this myth of control, like a comforting bedtime story, attempts to soothe our inherent fears and anxieties by proclaiming our capacity to mould and manoeuvre our surroundings (Skinner, 1971; Langer, 1975). Yet, this belief often leads us down a labyrinth of misunderstanding, as it dismisses the boundaries of our knowledge, the unpredictability of complex systems, and the role of the capricious dice of chance and randomness in determining outcomes (Taleb, 2007).

The embrace of uncertainty, in contrast, requires a certain humility: a recognition of the limitations of our knowledge and our dominion, whilst simultaneously acknowledging the potential treasure trove of opportunities and possibilities that uncertain situations may harbour (Marris, 1996). This embrace, far from a surrender, is an invitation to dance with the unknown, to develop a more adaptive and resilient mindset. It equips individuals and organisations with a compass to navigate the labyrinth of complexities and challenges that the world presents (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). In the words of Keats, it is about being “capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason”, to embody what he called “negative capability”. It is in this space, teetering on the edge of the known and the unknown, where true creativity and adaptability reside.

The notion of “safe uncertainty”, an ingenious proposal by Mason (1993), offers a sturdy yet flexible bridge between our innate craving for safety through the proxy of control and the irrefutable presence of uncertainty. Safe uncertainty, in this context, is a state of acceptance; a state where individuals and organisations acknowledge the wild unpredictability of the world, while maintaining a sense of competence and efficacy in their actions and decisions. This approach is akin to walking a tightrope between welcoming new possibilities and risks and preserving an adequate level of stability and order to function effectively (Mason, 1993; Stacey, 2002).

Vulnerability, an inevitable facet of being human, is intricately woven into the fabric of the myth of control and our necessity to embrace uncertainty. Recognising and embracing our vulnerability paves the way to a more honest and empathetic understanding of ourselves and others, fostering a deeper sense of interconnectedness and empathy (Brown, 2012). Moreover, this openness to vulnerability can be the soil from which personal growth, creativity, and innovation bloom, allowing us to take risks, question the status quo, and venture into the realm of novel ideas and perspectives (Nussbaum, 2004).

The myth of control, with its futile efforts to enforce a deceptive sense of order and predictability onto an inherently uncertain and complex world, can be a stumbling block on the path of future orientation or epistemology. By embracing uncertainty, cultivating safe uncertainty, and acknowledging our vulnerability, we are better equipped to navigate the labyrinth of world's complexities and challenges. This approach, in its adaptiveness, resilience, and compassion, unlocks the door to personal and collective growth and a transformative societal shift. In this sense, we may find that the promise of control is less compelling than the promise of uncertainty itself.

VII. Conclusion

1.     Summary of findings

The myth of control—a profoundly ingrained myth in the human consciousness—arises from our deep-seated desire to quell fear, anxiety, and the ever-looming spectre of uncertainty by asserting sovereignty over our surroundings. This belief infiltrates the multiple strata of society, including political, economic, and technological spheres, often with the deceptive chase for control as an ostensibly consistent objective (Taleb, 2007).

However, this illusion hinges on a distorted comprehension of the world, as it overlooks the immutable limitations of human understanding, the whimsical dynamics of complex systems, and the pivotal role that luck and randomness play in determining outcomes (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Taleb, 2007). This skewed perspective can lead to overconfidence, rigidity, and resistance to change, thereby stymieing avenues for adaptation, learning, and development (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). By acknowledging the boundaries of control, we may find comfort in the acceptance of uncertainty and the possibilities it presents.

As an antidote to the illusion of control, welcoming uncertainty and vulnerability proffers a more accurate and adaptable viewpoint on the world (Marris, 1996; Brown, 2012). By recognising the inherent unpredictability and complexity of reality, along with our own limitations and vulnerabilities, individuals and organisations can cultivate a more resilient and reactive mindset, thereby enabling them to steer through the ever-shifting terrain of life more effectively (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007).

2.     Implications for the myth of control

The implications of understanding the myth of control are far-reaching, encompassing various aspects of personal, social, and organisational life. By dissecting the myth of control and analysing its consequences, we can foster a more adaptive, resilient, and compassionate approach to navigating the complexities of the world. Recognising the myth of control can facilitate personal growth by promoting a greater sense of self-awareness, humility, and acceptance of one’s limitations (Brown, 2012). This awareness can lead to healthier coping strategies for managing stress, anxiety, and uncertainty, ultimately contributing to improved well-being and quality of life (Marris, 1996).

Understanding the myth of control can enhance interpersonal relationships by fostering empathy, compassion, and a deeper sense of interconnectedness (Nussbaum, 2004). By acknowledging our own vulnerabilities and limitations, we are better equipped to appreciate the challenges faced by others and cultivate more meaningful and supportive connections (Brown, 2012).

In the context of organisations, debunking the myth of control can promote a more adaptive and flexible approach to decision-making, problem-solving, and change management (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). By acknowledging the inherent unpredictability and complexity of the world, organisations can develop a more agile and responsive mindset, better suited to navigating the challenges and uncertainties of the modern business environment (Stacey, 2002).

Implicit in the myth of control are ethical and social implications, as it raises questions about responsibility, accountability, and power dynamics (Nussbaum, 2004). By challenging the assumption of control, we can foster a more nuanced and ethical discourse around issues such as social justice, inequality, and environmental sustainability, promoting a more equitable and compassionate society (Rawls, 1971). Recognising the myth of control can stimulate innovation and creativity by encouraging individuals and organisations to embrace risk, challenge conventional wisdom, and explore novel ideas and perspectives (Nussbaum, 2004).

3.     Suggestions for future research and interventions

Future research should continue to explore the psychological, social, and organisational underpinnings of the myth of control, as well as its consequences and implications. This may include investigations into the cognitive, emotional, and motivational processes that give rise to the illusion of control, as well as the factors that contribute to its resilience and pervasiveness in various cultural and historical contexts. Moreover, research should seek to identify the conditions and interventions that can facilitate the transition from control-oriented mindsets to more adaptive and resilient ways of thinking and acting. Interventions aimed at debunking the myth of control and promoting more adaptive perspectives may be developed and implemented at multiple levels, encompassing individual, interpersonal, organisational, and societal domains:

Developing and implementing psychoeducational programs aimed at fostering awareness and understanding of the myth of control, as well as promoting more adaptive coping strategies for managing uncertainty, complexity, and vulnerability (Brown, 2012; Marris, 1996).

Encouraging the practice of mindfulness and meditation techniques, which have been shown to enhance self-awareness, emotional regulation, and cognitive flexibility, as well as promote a greater acceptance of uncertainty and vulnerability (Mason, 1993; Kabat-Zinn, 2003).

Designing and delivering training and development programs for organisations, focused on cultivating adaptive leadership, change management, and decision-making skills, as well as fostering a culture of learning, innovation, and resilience (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007).

Engaging in policy and advocacy initiatives aimed at challenging the myth of control in various social, economic, and political spheres, and promoting more equitable, sustainable, and compassionate approaches to addressing global challenges and uncertainties (Nussbaum, 2004).

The myth of control, though seemingly attractive in offering a sense of predictability and security, is fundamentally flawed and often counterproductive. It is born out of our deep-seated desire to navigate the unpredictable sea of life with the compass of certainty—where perhaps the compass of safety appears to offer a more reliable tool. However, this illusory belief, though providing a fleeting comfort, blinds us to the inherent complexity, unpredictability, and interconnectedness of us and our world.

Our attempts to assert dominion over our surroundings often disregard the boundaries of our understanding and the capricious nature of complex systems. Such attempts can, in fact, lead to overconfidence, inflexibility, and resistance to change, hindering our growth, adaptation, and resilience. In contrast, embracing uncertainty and vulnerability can engender a more accurate, adaptable, and compassionate perspective. By acknowledging the inherent unpredictability of life and our own limitations, we can foster a mindset of resilience and responsiveness. In this lies our true power: not in feigned control, but in acceptance of the unknown and adaptability to the flux of existence. The path forward, then, does not lie in clinging to the myth of control but in developing a more nuanced understanding of our relationship with uncertainty. In doing so, we can learn to navigate life's unpredictable waters with greater wisdom, resilience, and grace.

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